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there that economic behavior has shifted from competitive to non-competitive? What
evidence is there that structural and behavioral changes have resulted in adverse economic
performance? This paper reviews the available data and information pertaining to these
questions and provides some insight into the answers. Structural changes are reviewed, along
with discussion of one major causal factor for the changes. Then, numerous studies
conducted over the past twenty years are reviewed, i.e., studies carried out at different times
with alternative approaches and varying levels of data aggregation.
Implications and Conclusions
he research undertaken on structural change in the packing industry varies widely in
terms of data, i.e., data unit aggregation (transactions to annual observations), collection
length (one month to decades), and spatial aggregation (local market to the entire United
States), as well as methodological approach, i.e., econometric estimation of models with
several functional forms, simulation, game theory, conjectural variation, and combinations
thereof. Once conclusion is clear – there is a dynamic, bi-directional linkage between
structure, conduct, and performance.
Two additional issues also emerge from the research. The first centres on the fact that
most of the research leads to questions of the form, “How large is large?” or “How small is
small?” Price distortions of 3 percent or less were found in most studies. While these fall well
short of regulatory agency standards related to merger impacts and non-competitive behavior,
even seemingly small impacts on a $/cwt. basis may make a substantial difference to livestock
producers and rival meatpacking firms operating at the margin of remaining viable or being
forced to exit an industry.
A related issue revolves around the effects concentration will have on resource
distribution over time and on the future structure of agriculture, both the production sector
and the broader food sector, including processing and distribution segments. A short glance
at the recent history of the livestock feeding and meatpacking industries should provide
convincing evidence of the inter-relatedness among causes and consequences of structural
changes.
Structural Changes Reviewed
Only after considerable further investigation will we know whether or not
reform in the packing industry is necessary. It is conceivable that such
monopoly elements as exist yield desirable results. A less extreme possibility
is that results are undesirable but not sufficiently bad to bother about.
(Nicholls, 1940)
Structural changes in the beef industry preceded similar changes in the pork industry. This
review of structural changes focuses on steer and heifer slaughtering and fabricating and hog
slaughtering.
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In 1976, there were 145 steer and heifer slaughtering plants in the United States with
annual slaughter of 50,000 head or more (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration, 2000). These plants slaughtered 22.4 million cattle. Plants with annual
slaughter exceeding one-half million steers and heifers annually numbered 5 and accounted
for 14.8 percent of slaughter by all firms in the over-50,000 head per year category. Average
slaughter in these largest 5 plants averaged 666,800 head.
Comparable data for 1998 show major changes. The number of plants in the category of
50,000 head or more per year had declined to 38, but slaughter in these plants had increased
to 26.7 million head. Fourteen plants each slaughtered one million or more cattle in 1998.
These 14 accounted for 66.8 percent of total steer and heifer slaughter in the 50,000 head or
more size group. Average slaughter per plant in the largest plants nearly doubled from 1976.
Annual slaughter in the 14 largest plants averaged 1,274,400 head. The same trend is evident
also for boxed-beef processing plants.
Not only did plant size increase, growth and consolidation resulted in larger beefpacking
firms as well. There can be little argument that concentration in fed cattle slaughter and
boxed-beef production is high by economists’ standards. In 1976 for steer and heifer
slaughter, the four largest firms accounted for 25.1 percent of total steer and heifer slaughter
(a CR4 of 25.1) (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 2000). By 1998,
the four largest firms accounted for 80 percent of total steer and heifer slaughter. Their share
of boxed-beef production was even higher, 85.0 percent. It should be noted that the four
largest firms in 1976 were not the same as the four largest firms in 1998. Mergers and
acquisitions were largely responsible for the difference in leading firms. For example, a series
of mergers and acquisitions in 1987 alone, involving some of the largest meatpacking firms,
increased the CR4 in steer and heifer slaughter by 12 percentage points, from 55.1 to 67.1
(Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration).
Porkpacking followed a trend similar to beefpacking but changes were not as dramatic. In
1976, there were 141 plants with annual slaughter of 50,000 or more hogs (Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration). These plants slaughtered 66.0 million hogs and 12
of the plants had an annual slaughter exceeding one million head. Those 12 plants accounted
for 28.5 percent of the total for plants with 50,000 or more hogs slaughtered per year.
Average slaughter per plant in the 12 largest plants was 1,569,000 hogs.
The number of plants slaughtering 50,000 or more hogs annually had declined to 68 by
1998 but annual slaughter had increased to 90.3 million hogs. The number of plants
slaughtering one million or more hogs annually increased to 30 and their share of total
slaughter in the 50,000 head or more size group increased to 91.4 percent. Average slaughter
for the 30 largest plants increased to 2,849,000 hogs.
As in the beef industry, growth and consolidation led to larger porkpacking firms also.
The four largest hog slaughtering firms in 1976 had a combined market share (CR4) of 32.2
percent. Note the CR4 for hog slaughter two decades ago exceeded that for steer and heiferCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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slaughter. However, since then, the CR4 for hog slaughter has not increased as rapidly as it
has for steer and heifer slaughter. The CR4 for hog slaughter reached 53.9 in 1998.
The sharp trend toward fewer and larger plants was driven by the enhanced economic
efficiency and cost management associated with operating larger firms. Meatpacking is a
margin business. Firms buy livestock at a small range around the market average price.
Meatpackers do not control the market average price, because they control neither supply nor
demand; but packers can influence prices paid around that average price level. They sell meat
and by-products at a small range around the market average wholesale price. Again, they do
not control the market average wholesale price but can influence prices received around that
average price level. Thus, if gross margins are about the same for all firms, the firm with the
lowest costs experiences the largest net margin or profit. Therefore, meatpacking firms search
for ways to control costs per unit of output as a means of controlling net margins. As a result,
one of the driving forces in meatpacking is the need to be a low-cost slaughterer and
processor. And one way to achieve lower costs per unit is to operate larger, more efficient
plants at near-capacity levels of utilization.
Studies in the 1960s (Logan and King, 1965), 1980s (Sersland as reported in Ward,
1988; Duewer and Nelson, 1991), and more recently (Paul, 2001; MacDonald et al., 2000)
have found economies of size in cattle slaughtering and fabricating. MacDonald et al.
compared their findings with those reported in two previous studies (see Ward 1993 for a
detailed comparison of those studies). Sersland used survey data in 1985 for hypothetical
plants and operating conditions from beefpacker management while Duewer and Nelson
combined economic engineering and simulation with data for 1988. Both were essentially
cross-section estimates, whereas the MacDonald et al. study was a time series analysis of
Census of Manufactures data for 1963-92. The MacDonald et al. findings showed a slightly
greater degree of size economies. A cost index comparison for a slaughter-fabrication plant at
an annual output of 175,000 head for the three studies was 116.9, 111.2, and 130.7 for the
Sersland, Duewer and Nelson, and MacDonald et al. estimates, respectively. For a 1,350,000
head plant, comparable index values were 81.3, 84.4, and 78.6. Thus, results were quite
consistent and confirming of significant economies of size. Paul estimated cost functions with
monthly, plant-level cost and revenue data for the 43 largest beefpacking plants in 1992-93.
Results for cost economies were very robust. She found significant economies of size,
consistent with earlier work.
Recent work also found economies of size in hog slaughtering (MacDonald and Ollinger,
2000). MacDonald and Ollinger examined time series Census of Manufactures data for
1963-92. They compared their findings with one previous study that used cross-sectional
survey data for 1996-97 (Hayenga, 1998). Assuming reported average cost per head by
Hayenga for large plants was indexed at 100, the estimate by MacDonald and Ollinger was
111.7 for a plant slaughtering four million hogs annually. Hayenga assumed full-capacity
plant utilization, whereas MacDonald and Ollinger used data from actual plant utilization.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Less than full-capacity utilization leads to higher average costs compared with operating
plants at full capacity (discussed further below).
Size-economies research confirms that firms operate larger beefpacking and porkpacking
plants in order to be competitive. The consistent finding of economies of size is quite robust
across a variety of approaches (i.e., economic engineering, simulation, and statistical cost
analysis) and data (i.e., both cross-sectional and time series). While the magnitude of
estimated economies differs, the overall finding is consistent.
Plant utilization also significantly affects operating costs. Having a larger plant pays
dividends in terms of potentially achieving lower costs per head. However, to realize that
potential advantage over smaller plants, larger plants also must operate at high levels of
utilization. A larger plant at lower levels of plant utilization may in fact have higher costs per
unit than a smaller plant operated at near-capacity utilization. Research has shown that larger
plants operate at higher plant utilization than smaller plants (Ward, 1990; Barkley and
Schroeder, 1996; Williams et al., 1996). Thus, larger plants have lower costs per unit than
smaller plants both because they are larger and because they are operated at higher utilization.
Paul concluded that larger, more diversified plants (i.e., in terms of processing operations)
were more efficient when operated under higher rates of utilization. The importance of high
plant utilization appeared in early economies-of-size studies (Sersland as reported in Ward,
1988; Duewer and Nelson, 1991) and has been found in subsequent work (Anderson and
Trapp, 1999; Kambhampaty et al., 1996; Paul, 2001). The estimated extent varies, but the
overall finding is consistent.
Economies of size lead to dynamic structural changes. An example is given here for
beefpacking but would apply equally to porkpacking. When a firm expands a plant, say from
one-half million cattle per year to one million cattle per year, e.g., either by expanding the
plant or operating the plant at two shifts per day, the plant experiences lower per-head
operating costs. Also, one-half million cattle previously slaughtered by other plants are now
slaughtered in a single plant (ceteris paribus). Plants losing slaughter volume to the larger plant
experience higher costs per unit because their plant utilization decreases. The result over time
is that smaller plants experience higher costs and less profit, and go out of business, and
concentration in meatpacking increases. Evidence of this dynamic element was found in a
study by Anderson et al. of plants exiting the meatpacking industry over the 1991-93 period.
Plant-level variables in their model, i.e., plant capacity, age, and extent of horizontal or
vertical integration, significantly affected the likelihood of plants exiting the industry. Smaller
or fringe competitors were more likely to exit already-concentrated markets. Smaller plants
exit at higher rates than larger plants, due to smaller plants being less cost competitive.
The drive to operate larger, more efficient plants, capitalizing on economies of size, does
not explain by itself the increase in firm size, such as via mergers and acquisitions. Internal
growth as well as mergers and acquisitions have played significant roles in increased
beefpacking concentration (Marion and Kim, 1991) and porkpacking concentration. OneCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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factor leading to consolidation is economies of scope. Several aspects of economies of scope
are relevant to meatpacking. First is the extent of processing activities within a single plant.
These may involve slaughtering, fabricating, and hide and by-products processing. Paul
(2001) found evidence that larger and more diversified plants (i.e., in terms of processing
operations) have greater technological economies than smaller plants. A second aspect of
scope economies involves firms with more than a single plant, i.e., multi-plant firms.
Presumably, multi-plant firms operate at lower costs per unit than single-plant firms
(assuming plants in both firms are a comparable size). Historically, these economies have
been due to spreading overhead and administrative costs across several plants. Ward (1988)
argued that multi-plant firms also have advantages in procuring livestock for one of several
plants. Increasing pressures related to food safety suggest another advantage to multi-plant
firms. Instances can be cited where a single-plant firm experienced a food-safety crisis that led
to the firm’s eventual demise. Third, there may be economies of scope available to firms that
handle both beef and pork relative to firms that specialize in one or the other. These multi-
species economies may occur in marketing by-products as well as meat to wholesale and retail
buyers. While it is generally believed that economies of scope exist in meatpacking, little
research to date has estimated their extent.
One clear trend concomitant with increasing plant size, firm size, and buyer
concentration is increased livestock procurement by non-cash-price means, both in beef and
pork (Ward et al., 2000). A survey of the 22 largest porkpacking firms in 1992 prophetically
concluded that production and marketing contracts with pork producers would expand
rapidly in the next decade (Hayenga and Kimle, 1992). For 1993, the largest porkpackers
procured 87 percent of their hogs through cash market arrangements and the remaining 13
percent via various types of contracts (Hayenga et al., 1996). A survey of the largest
porkpackers regarding hog purchases in January 2001 was compared to previous surveys for
1999 and 2000 (National Pork Producers Council, 2001). Over those three years, spot or
cash market purchases declined from 35.8 percent to 25.7 percent to 17.3 percent,
respectively. Note these percentages compare with 87 percent just a few years ago in 1993.
The shift from cash market procurement to contracting and vertical integration has occurred
abruptly. Note also that contracting involves at least two parties, and motives for each party
may be distinctly different (Ward et al., 2000). Similarly, motives for entering into different
types of contracts vary by the contract type.
The trend away from cash market procurement by packers is more gradual in the beef
industry than in the pork industry (Ward et al., 2000). The first year the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) collected data on contracting by the four largest beefpacking firms
(1988), forward contracts and marketing agreements accounted for 15.8 percent of steer and
heifer slaughter (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 2000). Since
then, the highest level of contracting by the four largest firms was 19.3 percent the following
year (1989); it was 18.9 percent for the most recent year reported (1998). Contracts in theCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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beef industry are of two primary types: forward contracts (typically basis contracts) and
marketing agreements. Marketing agreements range from long-term supply contracts to
looser forms of supply contracts. How contracting is defined is important. Many contracts
are oral, and since the mid-1990s, grid pricing or carcass-merit pricing has increased in
importance. Many of these transactions are formula-priced, and thus involve tying a base
price to some reference market, often the spot-market price for a given time and geographic
area. Since some transactions occur two or more weeks prior to the slaughter date, they are
grouped with contracts by Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA)
and the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). Transactions with delivery within two weeks
of the sale date are considered spot-market purchases, though some could be contracts. AMS
reports non-cash-market purchases in their breakdown of feedlot volume as “additional
movement” and this category of shipments is increasing sharply. For the first year such data
were available, additional movements accounted for 19.6 percent of total shipments. The
percentage increased to 32.4 percent, 34.9 percent, and 41.3 percent for the years 1998,
1999, and 2000. Therefore, one could argue contracting has increased and reliance on cash-
market procurement has declined. But it needs to be recognized that not all of the additional
movement percentages represent contract purchases.
While not a market structure characteristic, the limited information available on financial
performance of the meatpacking industry may be instructive. Firm and industry financial
data are sketchy, in part because some firms are privately held and do not report profits
publicly. For publicly traded firms, some handle more than one species and report combined
earnings for their meatpacking operations. Other firms report earnings for meatpacking in
combination with related or unrelated operating divisions. Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration collects financial performance data from meatpacking firms and
has reported the data in summary form since 1992.
GIPSA defines operating income as gross income less operating expenses. Operating
income as a percentage of sales for the four largest meatpackers has fluctuated over the 1992-
98 period. It ranged from a low of 0.5 percent in 1992 to a high of 3.3 percent in 1995, and
averaged 1.6 percent for the seven-year period. Clearly earnings rates have been variable. For
many years, a 1.0 percent return on sales was considered a standard for the industry (Ward,
1988). The largest firms have exceeded that on average over the past several years. A higher
profit rate may be attributed to greater efficiency, exercise of oligopoly or oligopsony market
power, the move toward differentiated, branded meat items, or some combination of these
factors.
One might assume that the largest firms are the most cost efficient, given that they
presumably capitalize on economies of size and scope. However, profit rates for smaller
meatpacking firms exceeded those for the largest firms over the 1992-98 period. The 40
largest meatpackers had operating income as a percentage of sales ranging from 1.2 percent in
1993 to 3.7 percent in 1995; their operating income averaged 2.2 percent for the seven-yearCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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period. Higher earnings rates by smaller meatpackers seem inconsistent with the argument
that the largest firms are the most efficient or that they have exercised oligopoly or oligopsony
power. At least a portion of the higher returns to smaller firms may be due to their greater
involvement in higher-value products for niche markets and higher returns for differentiated
products that fit these markets.
Market and Firm Behavior and Performance Evidence
esearch that addresses market behavior, either for individual firms or groups of firms
(i.e., leading firms or the market as a whole), is linked directly or indirectly to market
performance. Similarly, studies that attempt to measure market performance are implicitly or
explicitly tied to market behavior. Thus, here a number of studies are reviewed that pertain to
both behavior and performance. Studies are grouped into four interrelated, indistinct
categories. Because an individual study frequently crosses category boundaries, one could
argue with my choice of discussing them in a given section. Generally, research is discussed in
chronological order based on the publication date.
Several studies, especially earlier ones, measure price impacts indirectly from market
structure characteristics, without knowing anything about specific conduct or behavior.
Examples include using such structural characteristics as number of buyers, bidders,
procurement method, and buyer concentration to estimate effects on prices or margins. This
approach tends to be associated with Bain’s structure-conduct-performance paradigm. In
recent years, an alternative approach based on estimating firm conjectures (the conjectural
variation approach) has increased in popularity. These studies, which offer conjectures
regarding buyer or seller behavior that leads directly to performance measures or outcomes,
are sometimes categorized as “new empirical industrial organization” or “new industrial
organization” research. Many economists consider the conjectural variation approach superior
to the previous, indirect method of measuring price impacts from structural and behavioral
changes. However, other economists note shortcomings of this approach and question its
presumed superiority. (These arguments are discussed further below).
Price and Market Structure Characteristics
Several studies have examined the relationship between prices paid for livestock by
meatpackers and various structural characteristics of the marketplace for the respective
livestock species. These studies generally adhere to the underlying relationship in traditional
industrial organization economics, where structural characteristics are causally related to
performance outcomes (Bain, 1968). All research reviewed in this section estimates price-
dependent econometric models, which typically hold constant many factors that influence
prices, such as supply, demand, quality, quantity, time and place variables. Thus, the focus of
the models and of this review is on the relationship between price and variables related to
market structure, e.g., number of bids, number of bidders or buyers (i.e., plants and/or
RCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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firms), institutional considerations such as marketing/procurement methods, and buyer
concentration.
Ward (1981) used transaction data from 1979 to empirically estimate the process packers
described in pricing fed cattle. He found a positive, significant relationship between prices
paid and either number of bids received or number of buyers bidding on each sale lot. Using
the same data, he found that prices differed significantly between the smallest buyer and at
least one larger buyer in half of the local markets he defined (Ward, 1982). Overall, larger
buyers did not pay significantly lower prices than smaller rivals.
Annual data for several states in two years (1972 and 1977) were used to relate prices
paid by packers and market structure variables, especially state-level concentration
(Menkhaus, St. Clair, and Ahmaddaud, 1981). Results were consistent regarding the
concentration variable. For both years, increased concentration was associated with
significantly lower prices. The researchers concluded that the concern over concentration in
beefpacking is warranted. It might be noted that concentration in steer and heifer slaughter
for the United States during the two years they considered was 26 percent in 1972 and 27
percent in 1977.
Transaction data from 1979-82 were used to assess the importance and impact of
competition on slaughter lamb prices (Ward, 1984). In alternative model specifications,
prices paid varied among packers, and the largest buyer (based on market share of purchases)
paid significantly lower prices than the smallest buyer. Prices increased significantly as the
number of bidders increased, and price differences for the teleauction increased in its favor
relative to a larger reference market as the number of bidders increased.
Another way to view potential competition is to consider the number of plants in a
market area. Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya (1986) examined the price impacts from closing
and opening hog slaughtering plants in the Corn Belt region. Six plant closings during 1978-
81 were studied, along with the re-openings of two of the plants in 1983. Using weekly data,
transitory price declines lasting two weeks or more were found for four of the six plant
closings and one of the two plant openings. Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya concluded that
concerns about adverse price impacts from plant closings may not be warranted. Adverse
effects, when found, were temporary in nature until the market adjusted to the plant closing.
The development of a pilot electronic market for slaughter hogs in 1980 enabled the
capture of transaction data, which allowed examination of the relationship between prices
paid and increased buyer competition (Rhodus, Baldwin and Henderson, 1989). The
researchers compared prices observed in HAMS (Hog Accelerated Marketing System) with
reference markets for slaughter hogs. Prices received by producers marketing hogs through
HAMS were higher relative to traditional hog markets during the 1979-81 period. The
authors concluded that the electronic market enhanced prices to producers due to increased
buyer competition.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Four-firm concentration in lamb slaughtering exceeded that for steer and heifer
slaughtering and hog slaughtering until the early 1990s (Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration, 2000). (Thereafter, concentration in steer and heifer slaughtering
has exceeded concentration in lamb slaughtering.) Thus, concentration in lambpacking has
been of concern to many people. Menkhaus, Whipple, and Ward (1990) used annual data
for four states over the 1972-85 period to examine the effect the number of lambpacking
plants had on prices paid for slaughter lambs. Results were inconclusive. Evidence was found
that prices received by lamb producers in states with only one plant were significantly lower
than in states with more than one plant. However, there was no significant difference in
prices received in states with 2 to 5 plants compared with states that had more than five
plants. They concluded that concerns are justified regarding non-competitive behavior when
the number of plants declines to a single plant.
A series of mergers in 1987 changed the buyer landscape for fed cattle in the southern
plains region and created what have since been called the “big three” packers. Ward (1992)
collected transaction data in 1989 similar to that collected ten years earlier to determine
whether buyer consolidation affected prices paid for fed cattle. Price differences were found
among buyers and prices were positively and significantly associated with the number of
buyers bidding on fed cattle. Both findings paralleled earlier work discussed above. Ward also
grouped the three largest buyers into a single variable to determine price effects from the “big
three” packers. Price differences were found among the three largest firms and between the
three largest firms and other buyers. The three largest firms together paid significantly lower
prices for fed cattle than did their rival firms in all local markets studied. However, when
examined independently, not all of the three largest packers paid lower prices than their
competitors.
Marion and Geithman (1995) used pooled cross-section time-series data to study the
price-concentration relationship in 13 regional fed cattle markets over the 1971-86 period.
They concluded that buyer concentration had a negative, significant effect on fed cattle prices
during the study period. They estimated several model specifications, used alternative
estimation methods, and divided the data into various time periods. Their results regarding
the effects of concentration on fed cattle prices were mixed. When they estimated the effects
for 1971-78 vs. those for 1979-86, they found that the concentration effect was negative in
both periods but more severe in the latter period, which coincided with higher regional
concentration. However, when the model for the entire period was estimated, the significance
of the concentration variable disappeared. They included a variable in some models for the
change in concentration and found a positive, significant effect on fed cattle prices. They
explained the positive relationship as being due to larger buyers paying higher prices for fed
cattle as they increased their market share.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Price and Pre-committed Livestock Supplies
Perhaps more contentious than the effects of concentration per se on livestock prices has been
the effect of pre-committed livestock supplies on livestock prices. Pre-committed supplies
were initially referred to in the beef industry, and later in the agricultural economics
literature, as captive supplies. Pre-committed supplies refer to vertical integration of livestock
by packers and various forms of contract coordination between livestock producers or feeders
and packers. Several of the studies reviewed in this section also estimate price effects from
pre-committed supplies using econometric models similar to those reviewed in the previous
section. However, the focus of these models is on the relationship between prices and pre-
committed supplies.
Elam (1992) estimated the effects deliveries of pre-committed supplies had on monthly
average fed cattle prices in the United States and in selected individual states (Texas, Kansas,
Colorado and Nebraska). Captive supply deliveries were inversely related to fed cattle prices
over the period October 1988 to May 1991. For each 10,000 cattle delivered under captive
supply arrangements, U.S. fed cattle prices declined by $0.03-$0.09/cwt., while for individual
states results ranged from not significant to minus $0.37/cwt.
Schroeder et al. (1993) collected transaction data from feedlots in southwestern Kansas
during May-November 1990 to examine the relationship between forward contracting
(including marketing agreements) and transaction prices for fed cattle. They used two
measures of forward contracts. One was contract deliveries as a percentage of the weekly total.
The other was each packer’s share of contract deliveries for each week. Results indicated a
negative relationship between forward contracting and fed cattle prices, ranging from $0.15
to $0.31/cwt. over the six-month data period. Impacts also varied for two-month sub-periods
and for individual packers. Price impacts were not significant for some packers and time
periods. Related to findings discussed in the previous section of this paper, Schroeder et al.
found a significant, positive relationship between the number of bids and the prices paid by
packers. Also consistent with previous work, they found that prices paid by packers were
significantly different over the data period.
Early work estimating price effects from pre-committed supplies lacked a strong
theoretical framework identifying the motive(s) for beefpacking firms pre-purchasing cattle
supplies. Azzam (1996) developed a conceptual framework for arguing the monopsony-
inefficiency motive for integration by beefpackers to capture fed cattle supplies. He estimated
the model empirically with aggregated, quarterly data for 1978-93. While the estimate of
vertical integration from the model exceeded the level believed to exist, the model provides
plausible but not conclusive evidence of the monopsony-inefficiency motive. However, he
noted the monopsony hypothesis in the model should be interpreted cautiously.
Azzam (1998) further developed a conceptual model for estimating the price effects from
pre-committed supplies, without incorporating a backward-integration motive. He found
that price effects depend on a complex combination of several variables, among them theCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
                                                                                                                                             ￿ 12
respective fractions of cash-market and pre-committed procurement supplies. His model
suggests that non-competitive conduct is not a necessary condition for negative effects on
cash prices from pre-committed (i.e., captive) purchases. Thus, Azzam argued that previous
work that suggested the inverse relationship between fed cattle prices and pre-committed
supplies is due to non-competitive behavior is not defensible.
The most extensive, detailed data to study price impacts from pre-committed supplies
were made available in a Congressionally mandated study on meatpacking concentration.
Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) estimated price impacts with alternative approaches.
They examined the interdependent nature of delivering cattle from three types of pre-
committed inventories and purchasing fed cattle in the cash market. They also modeled the
impact on transaction prices caused by the size of pre-committed supply inventories from
which future deliveries could be made. Transaction data were collected from the 43 largest
steer and heifer slaughtering plants, owned by 25 firms, for a one-year period, April 1992 to
April 1993. They found that increasing deliveries of cattle from two of the three types of
captive supply inventories were associated with lower transaction prices for fed cattle. A 1
percent increase in captive supply deliveries was associated with a $0.05/cwt. decline in fed
cattle transaction prices for forward-contracted cattle and a $0.36/cwt. decline for marketing-
agreement cattle. Simultaneity was found between cash-market transaction prices and
percentage deliveries of forward-contracted and marketing-agreement cattle. Coefficients on
individual captive supply inventory variables had mixed signs while the coefficient on the
total captive supplies variable was not significant. A 1,000-head increase in the size of captive
supply inventory was associated with: a $0.01/cwt. increase in transaction prices for the
forward-contract inventory; an $0.18/cwt. decline for the packer-fed inventory; and a
$0.02/cwt. decline for the marketing-agreement inventory. Related to the previous section,
Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder found a positive and significant relationship between plant
utilization and prices paid by packers, though the magnitude was small. Significant price
differences were found among plants and firms. There was a tendency for plants paying the
highest prices to be larger or located close to the primary cattle feeding area of Texas,
Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado and Nebraska.
Love and Burton (1999) developed a strategic rationale for backward integration by
packers into livestock production or feeding. Their model included various forms of pre-
committed supplies,  or backward integration. Two sources of gains were identified. First, a
dominant firm benefits from efficiency gains associated with expanded production. Second,
in their model the integrating firm pays a lower price for pre-committed purchases. Love and
Burton argued their results were consistent with previous research. For example, the Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration studies found:
(a) beefpackers paid higher prices for marketing-agreement purchases than for cash-
market purchases (Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder, 1998; Williams et al., 1996);Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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(b) higher rates of capacity utilization were associated with higher fed cattle prices
(Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder);
(c) higher rates of capacity utilization were associated with higher rates of pre-
committed supply usage (Barkley and Schroeder, 1996); and
(d) larger beefpacking plants paid higher prices than smaller plants (Ward, Koontz,
and Schroeder; Williams et al., 1996).
These results were predicted by the Love and Burton model. They concluded that use of pre-
committed supplies by beefpackers can be a potential source of market power. However, they
noted that market power exertion may not be the prime motive for vertical integration.
Schroeter and Azzam (1999) used similar data to that used in the Ward, Koontz, and
Schroeder study to examine the price and pre-committed supplies relationship. The Schroeter
and Azzam study had access to transaction data from only four plants in the Texas Panhandle
region but it covered a more recent period, February 1995 to May 1996. They found that
packers expecting relatively large deliveries of non-cash-market cattle paid lower prices in the
cash market. However, the magnitude was small. A 10 percent increase in pre-committed
deliveries was associated with a $0.02-0.04/cwt. lower price. They stated their findings were
generally consistent with previous studies. Schroeter and Azzam provided a logical rationale
for this relatively consistent finding and cautioned that the negative relationship is not
necessarily causal in nature, nor is it a sign of non-competitive behavior by packers. In
addition they found, as in previous studies, that packing plants paid significantly different
prices for fed cattle. Again, higher prices were found for fed cattle purchased under a
marketing agreement than for fed cattle purchased in the cash market, even after adjusting for
quality differences. Unlike Ward, Koontz, and Schroeter however, they also found one plant
that paid higher prices for fed cattle purchased by forward contract, though they stated this
may have been due to futures market conditions at the time of the study.
Zhang and Sexton (2000) employed a spatial model to illustrate how meatpackers can
use pre-committed supplies strategically to influence cash market prices. Their model hinges
on the importance of space (i.e., shipping costs relative to product value) to processors. As the
importance of space increases, it becomes more likely that meatpacking plants will create
geographic buffers between themselves, reducing competition in the cash market. Schroeter
and Azzam examined the Texas Panhandle data to see if conditions matched those predicted
by the Zhang and Sexton model. Two predictions implied from the Zhang and Sexton model
were not verified by the Texas data. Those were that fed cattle procured by non-cash-market
methods were shipped farther than those procured in the cash market, and that packers did
not compete in their rivals’ cash-market territory. Whether or not the scope of the geographic
region and the data period were sufficient to adequately test the Zhang and Sexton model was
not addressed.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Concentration and Margins
Marketing margins have been a topic of research interest in the agricultural economics
profession for a long time. One point of interest is whether or not market structure
characteristics affect marketing margins, i.e., farm-wholesale, wholesale-retail, or farm-retail.
The basis for these studies is the presumed linkage between market structure and economic
performance. Structural characteristics may allow firms to behave in a manner that leads to
lower input prices, higher output prices, or a combination of both. In any of those cases,
marketing margins would widen (ceteris paribus).
Schroeter and Azzam (1990) extended the conjectural variation approach from Schroeter
to meatpacking firms processing more than one livestock species, i.e., beef and pork.
Specifically, they estimated the degree of monopoly/monopsony power in farm-retail price
spreads. They estimated their model with quarterly data for the period 1976 to 86. They
found evidence of monopoly/monopsony conduct and estimated that nearly half of farm-
retail price spreads for beef and pork (55 percent and 37 percent, respectively) could be
attributed to monopoly/monopsony distortions. It should be noted that Schroeter and Azzam
assumed fully integrated meatpacking firms and ignored all vertical relationships in the
industry. They also noted data limitations in estimating the model.
Schroeter and Azzam (1991) developed a conceptual framework to decompose marketing
margins into components, including oligopsony and oligopoly price distortions. They
empirically applied the model to the porkpacking industry with weekly data for 1972-88.
Note that during this period four-firm concentration ranged from 31.6 in 1972 to 33.5 in
1988 (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 2000). They found that
oligopsony and oligopoly price distortions were not significant for the period studied, but
also were not zero. In testing for differences in sub-periods (i.e., 1980s compared with
1970s), Schroeter and Azzam found evidence for less concern about oligopsony and oligopoly
price distortions in the latter period than the earlier period, despite increased regional
concentration in hog slaughter.
Brester and Musick (1995) used monthly data for 1980-92 to study the effect
concentration in lambpacking had on farm-wholesale and farm-retail marketing margins.
Results showed that increases in lambpacking concentration had small, positive effects on
marketing margins, both farm-wholesale and farm-retail. However, Brester and Musick did
not conclude that lambpacking firms used market power to lower slaughter lamb prices or
raise retail prices, since the widening margins may have been associated with increased costs
of processing as the industry converted from carcass to boxed-lamb processing and
distribution.
One objective of an Economic Research Service study was to estimate the effect
concentration has had on farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail marketing margins in the beef
industry (Matthews et al., 1999). They estimated an asymmetric price adjustment model to
determine whether or not price spreads change at the same rate when prices are decreasing asCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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when prices are increasing. They examined monthly data for 1979-96 and for the sub-period
1992-96. Using the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) as the measure of concentration in
beefpacking, they included it in the asymmetric price adjustment model. For the entire
period, there was no significant effect on marketing margins from increasing concentration.
However, for the sub-period there was a positive, significant effect. Thus, increased
concentration was associated with higher fed cattle prices and lower farm-wholesale
marketing margins. While unexpected based on the hypothesis of non-competitive behavior,
the positive effect was small. Matthews et al. hypothesized that gains experienced from
capitalizing on economies of size may be shared with cattle feeders, consistent with previous
research (Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder, 1998; Williams et al., 1996).
Ward and Stevens (2000) approached the question of concentration impacts on
marketing margins by examining price linkages from the producer-to-retail level in the beef
chain. Data were monthly observations over the 1974-94 period. They found that increased
beefpacker concentration has not translated into a weakening of the price linkage between
producers and packers or between packers and wholesale (i.e., purveyors-processors). They
found evidence that most of the pricing behavior change occurred at the retail not the packer
level. They further noted that concentration has not adversely influenced the speed of price
transmission in the beef chain. Thus, they concluded that increased beefpacker concentration
had little aggregate effect on price linkages between producers and packers.
Oligopoly and Oligopsony Market Power
Several studies reviewed in this section reflect the increased preference for the conjectural
variation approach. The intent is to measure directly the effect behavior has on performance,
i.e., the existence of oligopoly/oligopsony (or monopoly/monopsony) price distortions and
evidence of market power. However, other studies follow alternative approaches.
Schroeter (1988) was the first to apply the conjectural variation approach to beefpacking.
He developed a conceptual framework and applied it to annual data for the 1951-83 period.
He found significant conjectural elasticity estimates for 28 of the 33 years. Monopoly and
monopsony price distortions were relatively modest according to Schroeter, about 3 percent
and 1 percent, respectively. There was little evidence the degree of monopoly or monopsony
distortion had increased during the later years of the study, when beefpacking concentration
was beginning to increase sharply.
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) modified the conjectural variation approach to allow
different conjectures for input and output markets. They estimated the model with annual,
Census of Manufactures data for the meatpacking industry for the years 1959-82. Recall that
during this period concentration in meatpacking was relatively low compared with later years.
Azzam and Pagoulatos found non-competitive behavior in both the output and input
markets. Further analysis revealed the extent of oligopsony power was significantly higher
than that for oligopoly power.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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One limitation of conjectural variation studies reviewed to date is the extent of data
aggregation. Azzam and Schroeder (1991) recognized this problem especially as it relates to
the input market for beefpacking where markets were believed to be more regional or local in
nature. They developed a model to estimate oligopsony price distortions in 13 regional, fed
cattle procurement markets. They calibrated the model to approximate the distortion across
markets in 1986, then used simulation to determine the price distortion estimates for varying
levels of regional beefpacking concentration and behavior. Subjecting the model to sensitivity
analysis, they compared their results with previous research using econometric modeling.
Azzam and Schroeder found slightly lower price effects across market areas, less than 1
percent of the price level, compared with about 1.2 percent to 2.5 percent across market areas
or time periods in previous research (Ward, 1981; Menkhaus, St. Clair, and Ahmaddaud,
1981; Quail, et al., 1986). They concluded that their results indicated less danger of falling
fed cattle prices (i.e., oligopsony price distortion) as a result of increasing buyer concentration
than had been found in previous research.
Limitations of the conjectural variation approach were noted by Koontz, Garcia, and
Hudson (1993). They argued that conjectural variations say nothing about optimal pricing
strategies of firms and that often data used are highly aggregated. They studied non-
competitive behavior in short-run pricing of fed cattle by beefpacking firms. Non-cooperative
game theory was used to explain possible tacit collusion among rival packers. They showed
that in order for collusive behavior to be optimal, rival firms follow a dual strategy. Firms will
follow a cooperative pricing strategy at times and pay sub-competitive prices, while at other
times they follow a non-cooperative strategy and pay competitive prices. Daily fed cattle
prices from four regional markets for two time periods were used in the empirical estimation.
Times chosen were two periods of relative structural stability in the beef industry, 1980-82
and 1984-86. They found evidence of oligopsony behavior consistent with trigger pricing
strategies in all regions and both time periods. Their estimated conjectures of price distortion
were in the range of 0.5 percent to 0.8 percent. However, they found a reduction in the
oligopsony effect in the later period when buyer concentration was higher. Overall, behavior
was consistent with cooperative pricing strategies.
Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen (1993) constructed a system of demand and supply
equations in an imperfect market setting to examine pricing implications when fed cattle
supplies are anticipated or unanticipated. They recognized that beefpacking firms are
quantity-driven. Economies of size and utilization affect costs; which in turn directly affect
profitability. Therefore, fed cattle supplies are critically important in measuring market
behavior and its impacts. They used quarterly data for 1972-86. Their results suggest
beefpacking firms follow average-cost rather than marginal-cost pricing, consistent with
Ward’s (1988) hypothesis and other research. Fed cattle were priced below marginal value in
31 of 59 quarters. The markdowns during periods of anticipated supply were consistent with
average-cost pricing. Packer response to unanticipated supplies suggested that pricingCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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response is dependent on the size of the supply shock. Small shocks tend to be associated with
average-cost pricing. They concluded that decreasing buyer concentration is unlikely to result
in improved (i.e., higher) fed cattle prices.
Economies of size suggest increased efficiencies have occurred over time in meatpacking
as structural changes have taken place. Several studies also have found oligopoly or oligopsony
price distortions associated with the same structural changes, and leading to increased
concentration in meatpacking. Azzam and Schroeder (1995) addressed the trade-offs in
efficiency gains and oligopsony losses. They developed the model for the beefpacking
industry in general, and then specifically for regional fed cattle procurement. They used a
baseline period which corresponds in their estimation to the 1986-88 period, then used
sensitivity analysis to consider impacts from further structural changes (i.e., increases in
regional concentration but lower processing costs) and increased oligopsony pricing. Overall
they found that when consolidation leads to economies-of-size efficiencies and increased
oligopsony pricing behavior, even modest efficiency gains offset the oligopsony or welfare
losses. They estimated that cost savings of 2.4 percent or less would offset anti-competitive
effects from a 50 percent increase in beefpacking concentration. Their estimate of actual cost
savings was 4 percent. Thus, they concluded structural changes have been welfare enhancing
in the beefpacking industry.
Concomitant with structural changes in the meatpacking industry has been the decreased
consumer demand for red meats (Purcell, 2000). Weliwita and Azzam (1996) considered
declining demand’s impacts on beefpacking behavior. They argued that an oligopoly or
oligopsony will behave as a cartel and become more competitive with an unexpected decline
in output demand. In a game theory framework, firms will not distinguish between declining
demand and rivals cheating, thus inducing a punishment period. Weliwita and Azzam tested
for cooperative pricing behavior after unexpected declines in beef demand. They developed
the conceptual model and applied it to quarterly data for 1978-93. Results indicated that
declining demand did not increase the competitiveness of packers, either in fed cattle or beef
markets. Packers did not follow a cooperative pricing strategy either in fed cattle or beef
markets. Oligopsony price distortions of about 2.7 percent were found, within the range of
those found in previous research.
Driscoll, Kambhampaty, and Purcell (1997) tested for short-run profit-maximizing
behavior of beefpacking firms. They argue that if profit maximization is not followed, then
estimates of conjectural elasticities are biased. They devised a nonparametric test for profit
maximization and applied it to weekly data from 15 plants in two regions for a one-year
period in 1992-93. They applied the test to weekly, plant-level data, then merged data into
four levels of aggregation, ultimately to monthly, firm-level data. They found, both for
weekly and monthly data, that plants and firms did not appear to follow profit-maximizing
behavior. Plants regularly operated at production levels below those needed to achieve static
profit maximization. Results were consistent with hypothesized behavior proposed by WardCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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(1988), that meatpacking firms use average-cost pricing and may be profit satisficers.
Driscoll, Kambhampaty, and Purcell found very little evidence of oligopolistic or
oligopsonistic behavior when profit maximization was assumed, consistent with small price
distortions found in previous research. They argued that use of conjectural variations is
inappropriate when short-term, static profit maximization is assumed. However, they did not
rule out profit-maximizing behavior over several periods.
According to Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), one assumption commonly, and arguably
incorrectly, made in conjectural variation studies is that of fixed-proportions technology.
They developed a model relaxing this assumption in favor of variable proportions or
substitutability among the non-specialized inputs. They contended their approach requires
less data in the empirical estimation process and applied the model to annual data for 1967-
93. They found negligible oligopsony price distortion, contrary to previous models using
fixed proportions.
Koontz and Garcia (1997) extended the Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993) non-
cooperative game to measure the competitiveness of beefpacking firms across regional fed
cattle markets. Multi-plant firms encounter each other in multiple markets. The Koontz and
Garcia model enables accounting for firm behavior in all relevant markets. They used daily
data from eight regional fed cattle markets for the periods 1980-82 and 1984-86. Multiple-
market oligopsony was found across geographic fed cattle markets and evidence indicated
coordinated behavior across markets. The oligopsony finding was consistent with previous
research on single-market oligopsony. Also consistent was the finding that the extent of
oligopsony was small and that the effect was greater in the earlier period than the latter
period, despite regional concentration being higher in the latter period. Overall, Koontz and
Garcia concluded that oligopsony behavior in fed cattle procurement is non-constant over
time and space.
While oligopsony/oligopoly price distortions have been found in some studies, Schroeter,
Azzam, and Zhang (2000) explored the oligopoly question in relation to the retail market.
Specifically, they developed a model to test for bilateral oligopoly of meatpacking and retail
firms, but allowed for oligopoly behavior by packers and oligopsony behavior by retailers.
Using monthly data for 1990-94, they concluded the data best fit a model of oligopsony
behavior by retailers. They found that meatpackers were price-takers with little or no
evidence of oligopoly behavior.
Paul (2001) estimated oligopoly and oligopsony power with monthly, plant-level cost
and revenue data for the 43 largest beefpacking plants for a one-year period in 1992-93. She
also estimated cost functions and found results both for cost economies and market power to
be very robust. Her findings confirmed significant economies of size, as discussed above. In
addition, she found little evidence of price-depressing, oligopsonistic effects for fed cattle.
Her findings were consistent with the previous research on trade-offs between cost efficiency
gains and oligopsony losses (Azzam and Schroeter, 1995).Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Summary of the Evidence and Concluding Comments
ables 1 to 4 summarize the research reviewed in this paper. One point is clear. Research
varies widely in terms of data, i.e., data unit aggregation (transactions to annual
observations), collection length (one month to decades), and spatial aggregation (local market
to the entire United States), as well as methodological approach, i.e., econometric estimation
of models with several functional forms, simulation, game theory, conjectural variation, and
combinations thereof.
Azzam and Anderson (1996) conducted an extensive review of competition in
meatpacking. In their summary, they offered criticisms both of the structure-conduct-
performance approach and the conjectural variation approach. They concluded the body of
empirical evidence was insufficient to argue persuasively the meatpacking industry was not
competitive. Sexton (2000) reported on more recent critiques of the conjectural variation
approach. Despite the weaknesses of the approach, he concluded that market power estimates
in meatpacking (i.e., the focus of much of the conjectural variation literature) are modest,
and structural changes on balance are probably beneficial from an efficiency viewpoint.
In reviewing the available evidence, my interpretation appears consistent with theirs.
Examining the evidence in the tables, either by data aggregation, methodology, or time
period, yields little difference in interpretation. Research shows a dynamic, bi-directional
linkage between structure, conduct, and performance. This exhibits itself in the research that
measures indirectly the linkage between structure and performance as well as in the research
that measures directly the linkage between behavior and performance.
It seems both the structure-conduct-performance approach and the conjectural variation
approach share a related weakness. In the Bainsian structure-conduct-performance approach,
excessive emphasis is placed on a single structural characteristic, i.e., the concentration ratio
or HHI, as a predictor of conduct and performance. In the conjectural variation approach,
emphasis shifts to a single conduct variable, i.e., the conjectural variation coefficient, as a
descriptor of conduct and predictor of performance. In either case, relatively little emphasis is
placed on the “how” and competitive dynamics, especially of rivals’ reactions.
Besides the “how” of exercising market power, two additional central issues emerge. The
first centres on the fact that most of the research leads to questions of the form, “How large is
large?” or “How small is small?” Price distortions of 3 percent or less were found in most
studies. These fall well short of regulatory agency standards related to merger impacts and
non-competitive behavior, which often assume a 5 percent price impact rule (U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1997). However, the courts and
regulatory agencies have defined specifically neither how much market power is “significant”
nor for how long a firm or firms must maintain significant market power (Carlton and
Perloff, 1994).
From another viewpoint, seemingly small impacts on a $/cwt. basis may make a
substantial difference to livestock producers and rival meatpacking firms operating at the
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margin of remaining viable or being forced to exit an industry. In relatively low-profit
businesses, “small” degrees of market power can have significant profit implications. Even
“small” $/cwt. or percentage impacts represent large total-dollar sums, especially summed
over long time periods. To some, these provide clear targets for antitrust lawsuits, conclusive
evidence of lax antitrust enforcement, and undeniable grounds for corrective legislation.
A related issue revolves around comments made by Sexton (2000) and examined further
in Sexton and Zhang (2001). Given the bi-directional dynamics stemming from structure-
conduct-performance relationships, concentration impacts have implications for resource
distribution over time and for the future structure of agriculture, both the production sector
and the broader food sector, including processing and distribution segments. A short glance
at the recent history of the livestock feeding and meatpacking industries should provide
convincing evidence of the inter-relatedness among causes and consequences of structural
changes. Sexton and Zhang addressed the issue of market power from the standpoint of
adjacent segments of the marketing channel and potential effects on resource distribution.
They argued the emphasis on performance should be broader than simply efficiency, and
should encompass welfare distribution effects as well.
Having spoken to producer groups for 25 years, followed structural changes in
meatpacking during that time, conducted some of the relevant research, and reviewed others’
research pertinent to the issue, I have frequently had a question posed to me: What should be
done or what can be done to reverse the trend? Some people of course want to do nothing
and allow the market to function unencumbered by external regulations and constraints.
Some people want to turn back the clock. They would administratively alter the market
structure where problems seemingly occur, that is, they would break up large meatpacking
firms initially and restrict presumably problematic behavior, i.e., eliminate contracting and
vertical integration. Some people want to treat agriculture as a unique sector of society and
create laws and regulations applicable to agriculture alone, regardless of whether or not they
apply to other sectors of the economy. Relatively little thought is given in many cases to
public and private costs, or to public and private benefits, of these alternatives, even though
the sector is codependent with the rest of the economy.
Evidence of structural changes is clear and conclusive. Research findings on causes and
consequences, while less clear, are relatively robust considering the diversity of data and
myriad of approaches. Economists have contributed relatively little, perhaps as should be the
case, to policy alternatives and prescriptions dealing with structural change issues. Two
divergent alternatives arise implicitly through all the research conducted to date. One is to do
virtually nothing, allow economics to dictate the future, and simply continue conducting
research to measure and monitor the impacts of rising concentration. The other is to
advocate, perhaps without clear research to assess impacts and guide decision-making, for
more intrusive governmental actions aimed at limiting harmful changes and impacts. Neither
may be very satisfying to agricultural producers and policymakers.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Period Major Relevant Findings, Conclusions
Ward 1981 Transactions,
Local
1979 Positive relationship between fed cattle prices
and number of buyers or bidders
Ward 1982 Transactions,
Local








1979-82 Positive relationship between slaughter lamb
prices and number of bidders
Slaughter lamb price differences between
smaller and larger buyers
Hayenga, Deiter,
and Montoya
Weekly, Local 1978-81 Temporary price declines (increases) when









Annual, State 1972-85 States with one slaughter plant associated with
lower slaughter lamb prices
Ward 1992 Transactions,
Local
1989 Positive relationship between fed cattle prices
and number of buyers bidding
Fed cattle price differences between smaller
and larger buyers




Annual, Regional 1971-86 Higher concentration associated with lower fed
cattle pricesCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Period Major Relevant Findings, Conclusions
Elam Monthly, State 1988-91 Lower fed cattle prices associated with higher
deliveries of pre-committed supplies
Schroeder et al. Transactions,
Local
1990 Lower fed cattle prices associated with higher
levels of forward contracting
Positive relationship between fed cattle prices
and number of bids
Fed cattle price differences between buyers
Azzam 1996 Quarterly, U.S. 1978-93 Evidence of monopsony-inefficiency motive for
vertical integration of fed cattle procurement by
packers
Azzam 1998 Conceptual model of packer use of pre-
committed supplies suggests an inverse
relationship between price and pre-committed
supplies is not due to non-competitive behavior
Ward, Koontz, and
Schroeder
Transactions, U.S. 1992-93 Lower fed cattle prices associated with
increased deliveries of two types of pre-
committed supplies
Positive relationship between fed cattle prices
and higher plant utilization
Fed cattle price differences between plants
and firms
Higher fed cattle prices near the centre of price
discovery
Love and Burton Conceptual model of packer use of pre-
committed supplies suggests that packers pay
a lower price for pre-committed supplies and






1995-96 Lower fed cattle prices associated with
increased deliveries of pre-committed supplies
Higher fed cattle prices associated with one
type of pre-committed supplies
Fed cattle price differences between plants
and firms
Zhang and Sexton Conceptual model of packer use of pre-
committed supplies suggests packers may
create a geographic buffer between them,
reducing competition and resulting in lower
prices paid for livestockCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Period Major Relevant Findings, Conclusions
Schroeter and
Azzam 1990
Quarterly, U.S. 1976-86 Evidence of monopoly, monopsony behavior
by packers in beef and pork
Schroeter and
Azzam 1991
Weekly, U.S. 1972-88 No significant oligopoly, oligopsony price
distortions for pork
Brester and Musick Monthly, U.S. 1980-92 Increased concentration associated with higher
farm-wholesale, farm-retail marketing margins
for lamb
Matthews, Jr. et al. Monthly, U.S. 1979-96 No significant association between increased
packer concentration and marketing margins
for the entire period
Increased concentration associated with higher
fed cattle prices and lower farm-wholesale
margins for the 1992-96 sub-period
Ward and Stevens Monthly, U.S. 1974-94 Little aggregate effect on beef industry price
linkages from increased packer concentrationCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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Period Major Relevant Findings, Conclusions
Schroeter Annual, U.S. 1951-83 Modest monopoly, monopsony price distortions
in 28 of 33 years
Azzam and
Pagoulatos
Annual, U.S. 1959-82 Evidence of oligopoly, oligopsony behavior in
input and output markets





1986 Small price distortions from simulations of






Evidence of oligopsony behavior consistent with
trigger pricing strategies




Quarterly, U.S. 1972-86 Beefpackers follow average-cost pricing






1986-88 Economies of size efficiencies more than offset
oligopsony price distortions for fed cattle




Quarterly, U.S. 1978-93 Declining demand not associated with increased
competitiveness of packers for fed cattle or beef






1992-93 Plants and firms did not follow short-run profit-
maximizing behavior
Little evidence of oligopoly, oligopsony behavior
Muth and
Wohlgenant
Annual, U.S. 1967-93 Negligible oligopsony price distortion
Koontz and Garcia Daily, Regional 1980-82,
1984-86
Evidence of multi-market oligopsony behavior
across geographic markets




Monthly, U.S. 1990-94 Evidence of oligopsonistic behavior by retail firms




1992-93 Little evidence of oligopsony behavior by
beefpackers
Economies of size efficiencies more than offset
oligopsony price distortions for fed cattleCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues C. E. Ward
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